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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lonnie Hust appeals from the district court's Order of Dismissal regarding his
Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Mr. Hust asserts that the district court erred by
dismissing his Petition prior to ruling on his motion for appointment of counsel and
without appointing counsel to assist Mr. Hust in the post-conviction proceeding.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinns
On December 14, 2007, Mr. Hust filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction
Relief. (R., pp.3-7.) Mr. Hust simultaneously filed a Motion and Affidavit in Support for
Appointment of Counsel.

(Augmentation: Motion and Affidavit in Support for

Appointment of Counsel.)

In his Petition, Mr. Hust claimed that he had received

ineffective assistance of counsel when he requested that his attorney file a direct
appeal, but no appeal was filed on his behalf. (R., pp.4-5.)
The State filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition for Post Conviction Relief asserting
that Mr. Hust's Petition was untimely filed. (R., pp.8-9.) Shortly thereafter, the district
court filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the Petition as untimely.

(R., pp.10-11.)

Mr. Hust filed a Response to the State's Motion to Dismiss addressing only the merits of
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (R., pp.13-15.) He also filed a Motion and
Request for Stay on State's Motion to Dismiss, requesting that the district court "put a
stay on States Motion to Dismiss, until court grants petitioner request for counsel."
(R., p.16.)

Mr. Hust then filed a Response to Notice of Intent to Dismiss again

addressing the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (R., pp.18-20.) In

its answer, the State asserted three affirmative defenses: failure to state any grounds
for which relief could be granted, failure to file in a timely manner, and petition contains
bare and conclusory allegations. (R., pp.21-23.) On March 19, 2008, without ever
ruling on Mr. Hust's motion for appointment of counsel, the district court entered an
Order of Dismissal. (R., pp.26-27.) Mr. Hust filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the
Order of Dismissal. (R., pp.28-31.) The district court then appointed appellate counsel
to assist Mr. Hust in the appeal of the dismissal of his post-conviction. (R., p.32.)

ISSUE
Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Hust's post-conviction petition prior
to ruling on his request for counsel and by failing to appoint counsel to assist him in the
post conviction proceedings?

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred By Dismissina Mr. Hust's Post-Conviction Petition Prior To
Rulincl On His Request For Counsel And Erred By Failinn To Appoint Counsel To Assist
Mr. Hust

A.

Introduction
Mr. Hust asserts that the district court failed to follow the procedure for the

appointment of counsel in post conviction proceedings as set forth by the ldaho
Supreme Court in Sfafe v. Charboneau, 140 ldaho 789, 102 P.23 (2004), by filing to rule
on the motion for appointment of counsel prior to ruling on the substantive issues in the
case. Here, the district court failed to even rule on Mr. Hust's request for counsel until
his petition had been dismissed and he requested counsel a third time, for purposes
appeal. Mr. Hust has raised the possibility of a valid claim such that counsel should
have been appointed to assist him in his post-conviction action. See Swader v. State,
143 ldaho 651, 152 P.3d 12 (2007).

B.

Standard Of Review In Post-Conviction Cases
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in

nature. Goodwin v. Sfafe, 138 ldaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing
State V. Bearshield, 104 ldaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark

v. State, 92

ldaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. Sfafe, 121 ldaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d
1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992)). The Goodwin Court continued that, "[slummary dismissal
of an application pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary
judgment under I.R.C.P. 56." Goodwin, 138 ldaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628 (citations

omitted). "Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance
of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based."
Id. Moreover, "[aln application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an

ordinary civil action, however, an application must contain much more than 'a short and
plain statement of the claim' that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l)."
Id. The Goodwin Court noted that, "an application for post-conviction relief must be

verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and
affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the
application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the
application." Id. at 271-272, 61 P.3d at 628-629 (citation omitted). "In other words, the
application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." Id. at 272, 61 P.3d at 629.
ldaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for postconviction relief either pursuant to a motion of a party or on the district court's own
initiative. State v. Martinez, 130 ldaho 530, 532, 944 P.2d 127, 129 (Ct. App. 1997)
(citations omitted). "Summary dismissal is proper only when the evidence presents no
genuine issues of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle
the applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary
hearing must be conducted."

Id. (citation omitted).

Summary dismissal of an

application for post-conviction relief may be appropriate even if the State "does not
controvert the applicant's evidence because the Court is not required to accept either
the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the

applicant's conclusions of law." Goodwin, 138 ldaho at 272, 61 P.3d at 629 (citations
omitted).
The appellate court will exercise free review of the district court's application of
the relevant law to the facts. Nellsch v. State, 122 ldaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669
(Ct. App. 1992). The review of "a district court's construction and application of a
statute, the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA), is a matter of free
review." Evensioski v. State, 136 ldaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001) (citations
omitted).
On review of a summary dismissal of a post-conviction relief petition without an
evidentiary hearing, the appellate court determines "whether 'a genuine issue of fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits
on file; moreover, the court liberally construes the facts and reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party." Ricca v. State, 124 ldaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987
(Ct. App. 1993).
C.

The District Court Erred In Failina To Rule On Mr. Hust's Motion Requestina The
Amointment Of Counsel Prior To Dismissinn His Petition
ldaho Code § 19-2904 provides that a court-appointed attorney "may be made

available" to a petitioner who is unable to pay for an attorney. I.C. § 19-4904. The
decision to grant a request for counsel lies within the discretion of the district court.
Charboneau v. State, 140 ldaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004) (citing Fox v.
State, 129 ldaho 881, 934 P.2d 947 (Ct. App. 1997)). However, when "presented with a
request for appointed counsel, the court must address this request before ruling on the
substantive issues in the case." Id. (quoting Fox 129 ldaho at 883, 934 P.2d at 949).

In Charboneau, the district court dismissed Charboneau's petition prior to an
evidentiary hearing and "failed to rule on Charboneau's request for counsel prior to
deciding the substantive issues contained in the Petition." Id. at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111.
The Charboneau Court held that "the district judge should have first determined whether
Charboneau was entitled to court-appointed counsel before denying the post-conviction
relief on its merits." Id. at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. The Court then proceeded to define
the proper standard in determining whether counsel should be appointed to assist a pro
se petitioner as whether the petitioner "alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid
claim. . . ." Id. After defining the proper standard, the Court then gave guidance ("For
instance. . . .") on how to correctly apply the standard it had just articulated. See Id.
After defining the standard and addressing how to correctly apply it, the Court
concluded:
By not specifically addressing the appointment of counsel issue
before dealing with the substantive issues of Charboneau's Petition,
the district court abused its discretion. While clearly the standard
permits the trial court to determine whether the facts alleged are such that
they justify the appointment of counsel, in determining whether to do so,
every inference must run in the petitioner's favor where the petitioner is
unrepresented at that time and cannot be expected to know how to
properly allege the necessary facts. At a minimum, the trial court must
carefully consider the request for counsel, before reaching a decision on
the substantive merits of the petition and whether it contains new and
admissible evidence. Therefore, we vacate the dismissal of Charboneau's
Petition for post conviction relief because if, on remand, the district
court decides to appoint counsel for Charboneau, that counsel may
file an amended petition andlor additional affidavits alleging facts based
on admissible evidence sufficient to avoid summary dismissal.

Id. at 793-794, 102 P.3d at 1112-1113 (emphasis added). Thus, the language of the

Charboneau opinion is clear that it is reversible error when the district court fails to rule
on a motion for appointment of counsel prior to dealing with the substantive issues in

the case. If the Court clearly intended to apply a reversible error standard as evidenced
by the language in the opinion giving the district court an option to appoint counsel on
remand, rather than merely ordering that counsel be appointed on remand. The
rationale behind the Court's opinion is obvious: a petitioner must be given notice of why
the district court is not appointing counsel, so that he may supplement his petition, with
facts necessary to meet the much lower burden for appointment of counsel, than that of
summary dismissal, and remand is the appropriate remedy. On remand, with notice, a
defendant can then supplement his or her petition with sufficient facts for the
appointment of counsel.
Here, Mr. Hust filed his Petition on December 14, 2007, and also filed a Motion
and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel that same day.

(R., pp.3-7;

Augmentation: Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel.)

Mr. Hust

again asked that the district court address his appointment of counsel request when he
filed a Motion and Request for Stay on State's Motion to Dismiss, requesting that the
district court "put a stay on States Motion to Dismiss, until court grants petitioner request
for counsel." (R., p.16.) On January 14, 2007, the district court issued its Notice of
Intent to Dismiss, but failed to address Mr. Hust's motion requesting the assistance of
an attorney. (See R., pp.10-11.) Mr. Hust then filed a Response to Notice of Intent to
Dismiss addressing only the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
(R., pp.18-20.)

In response, the district court simply issued its Order of Dismissal,

finding Mr. Hust's Petition to be untimely, and again failed to rule on Mr. Hust's request
for counsel. (See R., pp.26-27.) In fact, the only time the district court ever addressed
the appointment of counsel to assist Mr. Hust was after he filed, in effect, his third

request for counsel, this time requesting counsel to assist him on the appeal, which the
district court granted. (R., pp.16-17, 32; Augmentation: Motion and Affidavit in Support
for Appointment of Counsel.) In this case, the district court judge never ruled on Mr.
Hust's motion for appointment of counsel or motion to stay proceedings until counsel
was appointed in the district court.
Thus, the district court erred not only in failing to rule on Mr. Hust's repeated
requests for counsel prior to dismissal of his action, as required by State v.
Charboneau, 140 ldaho 789, 102 P.23 (2004), but also in failing to rule on his request
for counsel at all in the district court. Accordingly, for this error alone, Mr. Hust's case
must be remanded back to the district court.
D.

The District Court Erred In Failina To Appoint Counsel To Assist Mr. Hust In His
Post-Conviction Proceedings
"[A] needy applicant for post-conviction relief is entitled to court-appointed

counsel unless the trial court determines that the post-conviction proceeding is
frivolous." Charboneau v. State, 140 ldaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111. ldaho Code § 19852(b)(3) sets forth the standard for determining whether or not a post-conviction
proceeding is frivolous. It is frivolous if it is "not a proceeding that a reasonable person
with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense." I.C. § 19-852(b)(3).
When applying that standard to pro se applications for appointment of counsel, the trial
court should keep in mind that petitions filed by a pro se petitioner will often be
conclusory and incomplete. Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged
because they do not exist, they also may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner

does not know what are the essential elements of a claim. Brown V. State, 135 ldaho

In Charboneau, the court determined that I.C. § 19-852 is no longer applicable to
a post-conviction proceeding, and that "for the purposes of I.C. § 19-4904, the trial court
should determine if the petitioner is able to afford counsel and whether this is a situation
in which counsel should be appointed to assist the petitioner." Charboneau, 140 ldaho
at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. Therefore, in giving notice of intent to dismiss the petition,
"the court should provide sufficient information regarding the basis for its ruling to
enable the petitioner to supplement the request with the necessary additional facts, if
they exist." Id. If he alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district
court should appoint counsel to give the petitioner an opportunity to properly allege the
necessary supporting facts." Id. (emphasis added). In Swader v. Stafe, 143 ldaho 651,
152 P.3d 12 (2007), the ldaho Supreme Court clarified its "possibility of a valid claim"
language from Charboneau. The Swader Court stated:
[Tjhe trial court should appoint counsel if the petition alleged facts showing
the possibility of a valid claim such that a reasonable person with
adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a
further investigation into the claim. The investigation by counsel may
not produce evidence sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. But, the
decision to appoint counsel and the decision on the merits of the petition if
counsel is appointed are controlled by two different standards.

Id. 143 ldaho at 655, 152 P.3d at 16 (emphasis added.)
1.

Mr. Hust Is Onlv Required To Show The Possibilitv Of A Valid Claim "Such
That A Reasonable Person With Adequate Means Would Be Willina To
Retain Counsel To Conduct A Further lnvestiaation Into The Claim"

In his Petition, Mr. Hust asserted that his rights were violated when his counsel
failed to file an appeal after Mr. Hust requested that an appeal be filed.

(R., pp.4-5.)

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that when an attorney's constitutionally deficient
performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that they otherwise would have taken,
the defendant has made out a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000). Thus, Mr. Hust has raised an issue
with regard to the assistance of counsel that he received in his underlying criminal
action, which is certainly a potentially viable post conviction issue. See Sfrickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); State v. Hayes, 138 Idaho 761, 69 P.3d 181
(Ct. App. 2003).
Both Charboneau and Swader only require that a defendant raise the possibility
of a valid claim, in order to have counsel appointed, all the while cautioning the district
court to review the post conviction liberally, recognizing the physical, educational, and
mental limitations a pro se petitioner might encounter as this Court eloquently observed
in Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 23 P.3d 138 (2001). Thus, the case law only requires
that a pro se petitioner raise the possibility of a valid claim in order for counsel to be
appointed, not that he include all of the elements of a valid claim, including the
applicable exceptions to the statute of limitations for filing a post conviction action.
Accordingly, because Mr. Hust raised the possibility of a valid claim, his case
should be remanded to the district court with instructions that counsel be appointed to
guide him through the post conviction proceedings.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hust respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
summarily dismissing his Petition and remand his case so that he may be appointed
counsel to proceed with this post-conviction action.
DATED this 23rdday of October, 2008.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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